*258

King's Bench Division

Friday, January 14, 1910

(Before Lord Alverstone, C.J., Bucknill and Bray, JJ.)

Despard and others (apps.) v. Wilcox and others (resps.)

Police -- Obstructing in executiuon of their duty -- Waiting outside residence of Prime Minister to present petition -- Refusal to go away -- Obstruction -- Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act, 1885 (48 & 49 Vict. c. 75), s. 2.

The appellants assembled in and near D.-street and Whitehall with the object of presenting a petition to the Prime Minister. They were informed that the Prime Minister could not see them, but they waited on for several hours outside his house in D.-street and refused to away when requested by the police. Their presence caused numbers of the public to collect in the streets. As the appellants refused to go away, they were arrested and charged with obstructing the police in the execution of their duty under sect. 2 of the Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act, 1885.

Held, that they were rightly convicted under that section.

Case stated on charges preferred against the appellants, under sect. 2 of the Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act, 1885, of unlawfully and wilfully obstructing the respondents being constables when in the execution of their duty.

It was proved before the Magistrate that a Sessional Order of the House of Commons dated the 16th day of February, 1909, had been issued to and circulated amongst the officers of the Metropolitan Police Force by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis in a police order dated the 17th day of February, 1909.

It was admitted that there was in existence an association of women known as the Women's Freedom League, formed for the purpose of obtaining the extension of the Parliamentary franchise to women, and that most of the appellants were members of such league. It was also admitted that No. 10, *259 Downing-street is the official residence of the Right Honourable H. H. Asquith, the Prime Minister.

The length of Downing-street from its point of junction with Whitehall to No. 10, Downing-street is 226ft. The width of the pavement opposite No. 10, Downing-street is about 6ft. Various public offices abur upon Downing-street, which is largely used by Members of Parliament and others in the public service.

With a view to prevent obstructions in the street and hindrance and inconvenience to the passage of members of the House of Commons and others through the street, and annoyance to members of the House of Commons on their way to or from the House of Commons, there were employed on the 18th and 19th days of August, 1909, under the orders of the Commissioner of Police, in pursuance of the Sessional Order, police constables in various parts of Downing-street and near to No. 10, Downing-street. Cresswell Wells is a superintendent of the Metropolitan Police Force, and the chief officer in charge of the police for the district in which Downing-street is, and under his orders and directions the other respondents, who are Inspectors of the Metropolitan Police Force, acted on the 18th and 19th days of August as hereinafter appears.

On the 18th and 19th days of August a number of women known to the respondents as members of the league were in and about the immediate neighbourhood of Downing-street and Whitehall in groups of two, three, or four together, and whose presence caused numbers of the public to collect in the streets and watch the movements of the women. At 2.30 p.m. on the afternoon of the 18th day of August the respondent Inspector Jarvis went to Downing-street and found Charlotte Despard and Ann Cobden Sanderson outside No. 10, Downing-street. They had just arrived. He went inside, interviewed the Prime Minister's secretary, and a messenger was sent out by the secretary to tell them, and did tell them, that "Mr Asquith has got nothing to add to what he has already written, and he cannot see you." Charlotte Despard and Ann Cobden Sanderson said that they must wait. At 2.40 on the afternoon of the same day the respondent Wells went to Downing-street, where the respondent Jarvis was waiting, and found the appellants Charlotte Despard and Ann Cobden Sanderson standing together on the footway outside No. 10, Downing-street. They explained to the respondent Wells that they were waiting to see Mr. Asquith. The respondent Wells then made a personal inquiry at No. 10, Downing-street and informed Charlotte Despard and Ann Cobden Sanderson that Mr. Asquith was not there. Whereupon they said they would wait until they could see him. They were cautioned by Superintendent Wells, who told them that he might have to arrest them if they remained there. At about 7.30 on the 18th day of *260 August, Superintendent Wells again visited Downing-street and found four women (including Charlotte Despard and Ann Cobden Sanderson) on the footway outside No. 10, Downing-street. Superintendent Wells said to them, "You have increased your numbers from two to four." Ann Cobden Sanderson replied, "We might increase them to nine or ten." The four women remained on the pavement. At nine o'clock, Superintendent Wells again visited Downing-street, and found that there was a considerable movement of women, members of the league, and of the public in the vicinity, and, in consequence, Superintendent Wells ordered out a number of extra police to keep them on the move, and a cordon of police to be drawn across the end of Downing-street next to Whitehall. Counsel on behalf of the appellants objected to any evidence being given upon the hearing of the charges touching any occurrences or behaviour of any of the appellants on the 18th day of August. The magistrate overruled the objection, and admitted the evidence hereinbefore set forth as to occurrences on and behaviour of the appellants Charlotte Despard and Ann Cobden Sanderson.

On the 19th day of August, at 12.6 p.m., Mr. Asquith drove up in a cab to No. 10, Downing-street. The appellants Lily Boileau and Janet Legate Bunten were standing on the pavement in front of the house. Inspector Smally and other police officers were on duty there, and took up such a position on the pavement in front of No. 10, Downing-street that the Prime Minister would walk from the cab, between them, to the doorway of No. 10. Lily Boileau, as the Prime Minister got out of the cab, said, "Mr. Asquith, we have been waiting here six weeks with this. Will you take it?" apparently referring to a cardboard tube which she carried in her hand. The Prime Minister replied, "No; don't be silly; go away." Whereupon the appellant Lily Boileau threw it. But a police officer, seeing her arm raised in the act of throwing, caught her wrist, and a cardboard tube dropped, rolled into the gutter, and was picked up by her. There was no evidence as to whether the tube contained anything, or, if it did, of what nature it was.

At about 2.40 p.m. on the 19th day of August the respondent Cresswell Wells went with the other officers to Downing-street and found the appellants Edith Cranstoun and Irene Tillard standing on the pavement outside No. 10, Downing-street, each having in her hands a cardboard roll apparently containing a paper, but, if so, he had no knowledge what it was. He asked each them whether she was a picket from the Women's Freedom League and was told "Yes." There were a number of people, about thirty gathered together on the footway between Whitehall and No. 10, Downing-street, on the south side, watching the appellants and the police, but there were only the appellants on the same side of the street as the police. The respondent Cresswell Wells said to the two last-mentioned

*267 Court ought to say that where people have in fact been for several hours together guilty of concerted conduct which will most unquestionably lead to obstruction of the streets, and possibly to annoyance and disturbance in those particular streets which by statute the police have special directions to keep clear, that, when that conduct is proved to the satisfaction of the magistrate, we ought to say, because there is the right of the individual to go to Downing-street and knock at the door and put a letter throught the hole in the door, that therefore the magistrate is wrong in coming to the conclusion as a matter of fact that the only course the police could take was to obey their duty under the regulations?

In my opinion these police officers were acting in the execution of their duty, and these ladies were, in the interests of their own objects, obstructing the police officers in the execution of their duty. I think, therefore, this conviction was perfectly right.

With regard to the distinction between the 18th and 19th days of August, it really is immaterial, because I think what happened on the 19th is quite sufficient, and Mr. McCardie indicated that, if we thought so, he would not make any argument as to the 18th, but I am bound to say, when you are dealing with this class of conduct and a number of different people coming and doing the same thing, what happened on the 18th throws considerable light upon what had been done on the 19th. It cannot be said that the action of these ladies on the 19th was wholly independent of the concerted action which took place on the 18th. I think, therefore, the appeal should be dismissed.

Bucknill, J. -- I agree. I should like to say that I myself agree with what Mr. McCardie said, that if a person or persons are reasonably and properly using the highway and that reasonable and proper user of it nevertheless attracts other people to cause an obstruction and block it up, the first-mentioned persons are not of themselves doing that which is unreasonable or improper. But here the magistrate has found that these ladies were themselves in the circumstances of the case using the highway in an unreasonable and improper manner, and, therefore, that the police officers were doing their duty in taking them into custody when they would no longer accept the invitation made to them, and very properly made to them, with much forbearance, to move on. Bray, J. -- I agree.

Appeal dismissed.

Solicitors: Kenneth Brown and Co.; Wontner and Sons.

Reported by W. de B. Herbert, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

*228

King's Bench Division

Wednesday, December 1, 1909.

(Before Lord Alverstone, C.J., Channell and Coleridge, JJ.)

Pankhurst and another (apps.) v. Jarvis (resp.)

Police -- Obstructing in the execution of their duty -- Deputation attending House of Commons to present petition to Prime Minister -- Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act, 1885 (48 & 49 Vict. c. 75), s. 2.

A deputation consisting of the appellants and other ladies, with the object of presenting to the Prime Minister a petition, went to the Palace of Westminster. On arriving at St. Stephen's entrance they were stopped by the police under the command of the respondent, and were informed by him that the Prime Minister would not receive the deputation. The appellant P. said that she was there to assert her right to present a petition to the Prime Minister. The appellant H. pushed up against the police cordon with a view to get through it to the entrance. In consequence of the appellants and the other ladies of the deputation refusing to go away and contributing to the obstruction of St. Stephen's entrance and of the access thereto and obstructing the respondent and police-constables acting under his orders, the appellants were arrested and charged. The respondent had received from the Speaker of the House of Commons certain orders, in pursuance of which he acted in the manner described.

Held, that the appellants were rightly convicted under sect. 2 of the Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act, 1885, of obstructing the police in the execution of their duty.

Case stated on a charge preferred by the respondent, James Jarvis, an inspector of the Metropolitan Police, under sect. 2 of the Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act, 1885 against the appellants, Emmeline Pankhurst and the Hon. Evelina Haverfield, for that they on the 29th day of June, 1909, did wilfully obstruct certain constables of the Metropolitan Police Force whilst in the execution of their duty as such *229 constables at St. Stephen's entrance (sometimes called the Strangers' entrance) of the Palace of Westminster.

Upon the hearing of the charge the following facts were proved or admitted :-

In pursuance of powers contained in the Police Act, 1839, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police on the 17th day of February, 1909, issued and caused to be circulated a certain police order. The order of the House of Commons therein referred to is a Sessional Order of the House of Commons. A Sessionial Order to the like effect has been in existence for great number of years.

On and before the 29th day of June, 1909, a certain handbill was circulated among members of the public by a body or association known as the Women's Social and Political Union, which is a voluntary association formed for the purpose of obtaining the extension of the Parliamentary franchise to women, and of which union the appellants are members.

On the 29th day of June, 1909, Charles Scantlebury, chief inspector of the Metropolitan Police Force, and in charge of the police on duty in the Palace of Westminster, received information that a deputation was coming to the House of Commons to see the Prime Minister, and that the appellant Pankhurst would lead such deputation.

The chief inspector and the police under his charge are subject to the Commissioner of Police in matters of discipline only with reference to their duties in the Palace of Westminster, and they receive their orders from the Speaker of the House of Commons through the Serjeant-at-Arms.

The chief inspector communicated his information as to the deputation to the Serjeant-at-Arms, and later in the day he saw the Speaker of the House of Commons, to whom he showed a letter hereinafter referred to, and he received from the Speaker certain orders, in pursuance of which he acted in the manner hereinafter appearing.

Further, on the 29th day of June, 1909, in consequence of the information contained in the handbill, the respondent was on duty in Parliament-square from and after two o'clock in the afternoon with a number of constables of the Metropolitan Police Force. Large crowds assembled in Parliament-square, and at about 6.30 the police, in pursuance of the police order cleared the square and formed cordons at various points, leaving a large space in the immediate vicinity of the Palace of Westminster clear of people. Into that space only persons were admitted who were members of Parliament or had business in the Palace of Westminster. Further, at all times material to this case a small body of police under the command of the respondent were stationed on the public footpath at the bottom of the steps leading to St. Stephen's entrance.

Shortly before eight o'clock on the evening of the 29th day of June, 1909, a deputation of eight ladies, consisting of the *230 appellants and six other ladies, some of whom had rolls of paper in their hands, left Caxton Hall, which adjoins Victoria-street, with the objects set forth in the handbill. The deputation went along Victoria-street and across Parliament-square to St. Stephen's entrance. The leader of the deputation was the appellant Pankhurst, and beside her was the other appellant Haverfield. The deputation was escorted on its way through the streets by Superintendent Isaacs, a member of the Metropolitan Police Force. On arrival at St. Stephen's entrance the further progress of the deputation was stopped by the small body of police under the command of the respondent, and the deputation from the time of their arrival until the arrests hereinafter mentioned stood upon the public footpath over which access to the entrance is had.

At this time about fifty or sixty persons, consisting either of members of Parliament or persons having business in the Palace of Westminster, collected in and near St. Stephen's entrance. There was no evidence that any person (other than the appellants) having business in the Palace of Westminster was prevented from entering or leaving the Palace of Westminster. At the time of the arrival of the deputation at St. Stephen's entrance the chief inspector was standing on the steps of the entrance. The chief inspector stepped forward and asked the appellant Pankhurst whether she was Mrs. Pankhurst. The appellant answered in the affirmative, and the chief inspector then handed her a letter in an envelope, being a letter from the Prime Minister's private secretary. The appellant Pankhurst read the letter and threw it on the ground, saying, "Am I to be denied my rights of seeing Mr. Asquith? We are going to assert our rights to enter the House." The chief inspector replied that Mr. Asquith would not receive the deputation, for reasons already given. The chief inspector thereupon re-entered the Palace of Westminster.

By this time the fifty or sixty persons had surrounded the deputation, and had collected on the pavement and near to St. Stephen's entrance, and the pavement became obstructed and the entrance and access thereto were obstructed, and the respondent gave orders to the police constables under his orders to clear the pavement and provide clear access to the entrance.

The conduct of the appellants and the members of the deputation was the cause of the persons collecting as aforesaid.

The respondent also requested the appellant Pankhurst and others comprising the deputation to go away. The appellant asked the respondent to take a message inside (meaning into the Palace of Westminster), which the respondent refused to do. The appellant Pankhurst further said that she was there to assert her rights as a subject of the King to present a petition to the Prime Minister. The respondent again pressed the appellant Pankhurst and the other members of the deputation *231 to go away, but they refused to do so. The appellant Haverfield meanwhile was speaking to the sergeant of the police forming one of the cordon in front of St. Stephen's entrance, saying she wished to see the Prime Minister. She was told that he was not in the House. She was asked several times to go away, but she said, "I am going to go inside and will use force." She pushed up against the police cordon with a view to get through it to the entrance.

In consequence of the appellants and the other ladies of the deputation refusing to go away, and contributing to the obstructing of St. Stephen's entrance and the access thereto and obstructing the respondent and police constables acting under his orders in their endeavours to prevent such obstruction of the entrance and access thereto, the appellants and others of the deputation were arrested and taken to Cannon-row Police Station, and the appellants were respectively charged.

The magistrate was of opinion that the appellants and the deputation were endeavouring to enter the House of Commons with a view to lay before the Prime Minister their demand for a vote and to petition him with that object, and that after they knew by the letter referred to that the Prime Minister refused to receive the deputation they remained at the entrance and refused to go away in order to assert an alleged right to be and remain where they were in order to carry out the aforesaid objects as stated in the handbill.

On behalf of the appellants it was contended that there was a right in every one of the King's subjects to petition a member of Parliament, and there was a further right in every one of the King's subjects to petition the King and that the Prime Minister as the chief Minister of the Crown is at the present day the proper person to receive such petition as representing the King, that the appellants were entitled to enter or alternatively to be and remain at St. Stephen's entrance for that purpose so long as the deputation of which the appellants formed part did not exceed ten in number and behaved in an orderly manner, and that there was no duty or power in the police to order them to move away, and that therefore the appellants were not obstructing the police in the execution of any legal duty and were consequently not guilty of the charge made against them.

On behalf of the respondent it was contended that, although there was an undoubted right in every subject of the King to present petitions to members of Parliament, there was no duty on a member of Parliament to receive such a petition nor was there any right in any subject to demand and receive a personal interview with a member of Parliament, whether a Minister of the Crown or not, for the purpose of placing before him any views on political matters, and that therefore when the appellants received the letter they were not entitled when the police told them to go away to be and remain where they were -- that is, on the public pavement near the entrance -- and that by refusing to *232 go away and by behaving as hereinbefore mentioned they were obstructing the police in the execution of their legal duty.

The magistrate held that the contentions put forward on behalf of the respondent were in the circumstances of this case correct, and he convicted the appellants.

Lord Robert Cecil, K.C. and Henl� for the appellant Haverfield. -- The appellants when they did the acts complained of were on the public highway, and if there were any obstruction it was due to their being prevented from entering the House, and from doing something they had a perfect right to do. It was the right of every subject to the King to present a petition to a member of Parliament, and the right to present a petition must involve the right to do everything reasonably necessary for the purpose. The statute against tumultuous petitions (13 Car. 2, c. 5), which prohibited the attendance of more than ten persons for the purpose of presenting a petition, recognised the existence of a right to present one. No one was prevented from going in or out of the House, so that there was no obstruction in fact. The case of Chaffers v. Goldsmid (70 L. T. Rep. 24; (1894) 1 Q. B. 186) was entirely different; it was an action for refusing to present a petition, not for refusing to receive one. Sessional Orders of the House cannot alter the ordinary law: (Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1.)

Avory, K.C. and Bodkin, for the respondent, were not called upon to argue, but referred to sect. 52 of the Metropolitan Police Act, 1839.

Lord Alverstone, C.J. -- In this case the appellants were summoned for resisting or wilfully obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty.

It really is not necessary to state the facts at any length, as they can be stated in a few sentences. The ladies were minded to present a petition to the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, in support of a claim which they had a perfect right to urge, and I agree entirely with the proposition laid down by Lord Robert Cecil that they have a right to present a petition either to the King or to present a petitoon to the Prime Minister either as Prime Minister or as member of Parliament. I do not think it necessary to draw any distinction between the two. I will assume that they were going to present a petition to him in both capacities, as Prime Minister and as member of Parliament. It is unnecessary to deal with the question of the presentation of petitions to the House of Commons itself or of petitions to the King in person, because everybody agrees that at the present day, according to the recognised law, peitions to the House of Commons itself are presented by a member, and petitions to His Majesty the King himself are presented through the Home Office.

Therefore we need deal only with the case which Lord Robert Cecil has urged before us -- namely, of a desire to present a petition to the Prime *233 Minister. Now, the action taken by the ladies on this occasion was not only to present a petition to the Prime Minister, but to present that petition by means of a deputation.

That is involved in the words in the case stated by the magistrate: "I was of opinion that the appellants and the deputation were endeavouring to enter the House of Commons with a view to lay before the Prime Minister their demand for a vote, and to petition him with that object," and therefore I assume, in favour of the contention which Lord Robert Cecil has urged before us, that they were minded to present the petition by means of a deputation, and the deputation went to present the petition.

It is not, however, unimportant, in reference to a certain incident in the case, that their claim was not only to present a petition, which I do not for one moment suppose Mr. Asquith would have refused to receive, but their claim was to go by deputation to present a petition, and therefore the action of the appellants followed upon desire by them to be members of a deputation to go into the House of Commons to present this petition.

It is quite unnecessary, I think, to deal with some of the points that have been raised by Lord Robert Cecil, not because I do not wish to treat everything he urges with respect, but because it seems to me they are a little beside the mark.

With regard to the precincts of the House itself, there can, I think, be no doubt that the Speaker and the members of Parliament, through the Speaker, have the right to make regulations as to how that access shall be restrained and controlled. It has been exercised for centuries, and I have very little doubt indeed that any court of law would recognise that there is a right in the House of Commons, through the Speaker or the House itself, to make orders as to any parts of the House to which people may be allowed to come, and under that power, as to which I express not the slightest doubt, a Sessional Order was made: "That the Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis do take care that, during the session of Parliament, the passages through the streets leading to this House be kept free and open, and that no obstruction be permitted to hinder the passage of members to and from this House, and that no disorder be allowed in Westminster Hall, or in the passages leading to this House, during the sitting of Parliament, and that there be no annoyance therein or thereabouts; and that the Sergeant-at-Arms attending this House to communicate this order to the commissioner aforesaid."

Then there was the order made by the Commissioner of Police for the purpose of carrying out the Sessional Order of the House of Commons. Therefore it must not be supposed that I have the slightest doubt that that order was a perfectly intra vires order, and one which, as regards the approaches to the House and the precincts of the House itself, the Speaker had a right to make. Whether such an order would justify interference with the passage of the public in the highway, particularly if it was not *234 necessary for the purpose of the order, is an entirely different question, and the point which Lord Robert Cecil mooted rather than argued, that this order or the powers of Parliament did not give the Speaker any power to make an order to interfere with the people on the highway, does not arise in this case, in my opinion, at all.

There is also a further power under the statute, to which Mr. Avory was good enough to call our attention -- namely, the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 -- that the Commissioner shall "give directions to the constables for keeping order and for preventing any obstruction of the thoroughfares in the immediate neighbourhood of Her Majesty's Palaces, and the public offices, the High Court of Parliament, the courts of law and equity, the police-courts, the theatres," and so on.

Now as regards the actual locus in quo there is no dispute. Everybody knows -- at any rate it has been stated -- that persons desiring to see members of Parliament do in practice and are allowed to go in by what is called the St. Stephen's entrance and so get to the members.

The cordon of police had been stationed very near -- whether actually on the pavement or not is not material for this purpose, but very near that entrance -- and upon the ladies arriving they were asked their business and were practically informed that they could not go any further.

Now, I called attention to the fact that it was not a mere attempt to present a petition to the Prime Minister, but to get him to receive a deputation; and that is important, because a letter was handed to one of the ladies, who does not appear here, though she has appealed, stating that: "The Prime Minister, for the reasons which he has already given in a written reply to their request, regrets that he is unable to receive the proposed deputation." That was a courteous intimation by the Prime Minister not in any way refusing to receive a petition or to consider a petition, but refusing to receive a deputation, not unnaturally, I think, in consequence of what we know did happen on previous occasions.

Under those circumstances Mrs Haverfield, who has, I have no doubt, very strong feelings on this question, which I can well understand from her point of view (and one respects people who desire to express their views in a legitimate manner), being practically informed of the state of things, and the other appellant Mrs. Pankhurst having thrown the letter on the floor and said that she was there to assert her rights as a subject of the King to present a petition to the Prime Minister, Mrs. Pankhurst was asked to go away with Mrs. Haverfield. Then Mrs. Haverfield, speaking to the sergeant of police said that she wished to see the Prime Minister, and being told that he was not in the House, was asked several times to go away, but she said, "I am going to go inside and will use force," and she pushed up against the police with a view to get through the cordon of police to the entrance.

Upon these facts it is not disputed that the police were there in the execution of their duty. No reasonable can, in my opinion, be raised as to *235 the right of the Speaker and the members of Parliament to control the access and passages to their House. No doubt can be raised as to the authority of the commissioner to prevent obstructions and interruption of passages and disorder at the doors of the House of Commons.

The presence of these ladies not unnaturally led to a large concourse of people assembling, and would most undoubtedly have led to very great disorder if it had not already led to it. Under those circumstances, the police having received orders which they were bound to obey, the lady, in the exercise of what she thinks to be her right, says, "I am going to use force," and endeavours to get through the cordon of police.

In my judgment she committed an offence against the statute, to which I have referred, and was properly dealt with by the magistrate for having committed an offence, and it seems to me that we need not for a moment consider what the case would have been if, under colour of this authority, a policeman had stopped a lady in the street and had thereby caused what Lord Robert Cecil calls an obstruction. He said that if any member of this court were stopped in the street by the police that would ipso facto cause an obstruction.

Well, that may or may not be, at any rate in this particular case the policeman was not purporting to stop the lady in the street, but to prevent the lady from doing that which undoubtedly would cause that which the orders of the commissioner and the Act of Parliament were designed to prevent.

In my opinion, without throwing the slightest doubt upon the right of every subject of the King to present a petition to the Prime Minister or to a member of Parliament, or to take any lawful means of making their wishes known and obtaining a remedy for any grievance they think exists, this lady was breaking the law when she tried by force to enter the House of Commons and she was properly convicted, and there is no ground for this appeal.

Channel, J. -- I am of the same opinion. Coleridge, J. -- I agree.

Appeal dismissed.

Solicitors: Hatchett-Jones, Bisgood, and Marshall; Wontner and Sons.

Reported by W. de B. Herbert, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

Do you have to give the cops your Name and Address? (by Andy Meinke, December 2011)

This causes lot of anxiety and confusion for people especially on demonstrations. Unfortunatly the law is a mess. Here’s the position as we see it (in England and Wales anyhow).

You do not have to give your name and address unless under a specific legal obligation (Rice v Connolly 1966). Refusal to give your name and address cannot amount to obstructing the police in the course of their duty under s89(2) of the Police Act 1996 but giving a false name and address can (Ledger v DPP 1991). Note this is pre Human Rights Act and the case has been criticised by legal academics and not surprisingly as the defendant said his name was “Freddie and the Dreamers”. In general you can use any name you like unless there it is for an illegal purpose. There are however a number of laws which make refusal or giving a false name and address to a constable a crime. All have a maximum penalty of a fine. 

1. Anti Social Behaviour

If you are reasonably believed to be committing anti-social behaviour (s50 Police Reform Act 2002). Anti social behaviour is defined as behaviour likely to cause Harassment Alarm or Distress the same as the offence under s5 Public Order Act 1986. Given that, any prosecution should be tied to a s5 (or more serious) offence. A stand alone case seems to invalidate the “reasonable belief” as if the constable had reasonable belief (a higher standard than the reasonable suspicion he would require to arrest for s5) why isn’t it being prosecuted? Presumably because the CPS don’t think his belief credible enough to give at least a 50% chance of conviction. We know of no test case on section 50. If and when one arises we imagine the following arguments to be used on appeal against conviction disregarding disputes as to the facts. 

A. Necessity. You didn’t want to give your address to the police as you feared it would be used by them to harass you or they would give it to the press or far right groups making you vulnerable to attack. 

B. European Convention on Human Rights Art 6- Fair Trial. The argument is you should not have to incriminate yourself by remaining silent. This failed in Strasbourg for a motoring case but this may be different.

C. ECHR Article 8- Privacy and Family Life. Intrusions have to be not only lawful but “proportionate” and “necessary in a democratic society“.

D. ECHR Article 10 & 11. Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Assembly. Being forced to give your details on a demonstration would have a “chilling effect” on legitimate protest. 

2. Driving. If you are the driver of any vehicle including pedal cycles you can be required to give your name, address and date of birth (Road Traffic Act 1988 s163-168). 

3. Obscure

Pedestrians reasonably suspected of failing to obey directions of a constable directing traffic (s37 Road Traffic Act 1988 ) who fail to give details commit a crime under s169 RTA. If you are a reasonably suspected of poaching in daytime (Game Act 1831 s31-31A), disrupting a public meeting (Public Meeting Act 1908) or disrupting an electoral meeting (Representation of the People Act 1983 s97). Pedlars must give their name and address on demand to a constable (Pedlars Act 1871 s17) 

Police Community Support Officers

There are different rules for PCSO'S bizarrely giving them wider powers than the police to demand your name and address if they reasonably suspect you of certain offences or anti-social behaviour. (schedule 4 Police Reform Act 2002) 

Lastly….when you don’t have to give your details but your mate down the pub reckons you do.

Kettles. The cops often ask people for their name and address as a condition of leaving a kettle. Frequently in conjunction with a search for weapons under section 60 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and a demand to remove masks under 60AA of the same act. As they have to fill out a stop and search form it makes it look more official and tricks many people into giving details they don't have to. Kettlings legal basis is totally separate from stop and search being the common law duty to prevent a breach of the peace (Austin v Met Police 2009) and also gives no power to take people's name and address. The cops presumably will claim that being willing to give your name and address makes you less likely to breach the peace and thus can be safely released but this has not been tested in court. It seams feeble reasoning but the courts give the cops great discretion in carrying out their duties however dimwittedly they do so. For example in the very first kettle at Euston 30th November 1999 the cops asked people if they had come to protest peacefully or violently

Stop and Search.- You don’t have to give your name and address, whatever type of search is carried out. This includes s43 & s47A Terrorism Act 2000, Conservation of Seals Act, Protection of Badgers Act, the lot. 

Arrest - If you are reasonably suspected of an crime a cop may arrest you if and only if it is necessary for a reason listed in s24 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. One of these is if they cannot ascertain your name or address. In theory for a section 50 you could be arrested on this ground, then give your details released by the police and then summonsed for not giving your name and address! You are under no legal obligation to give your name an address at any stage in the police station.

BRUTE FARCE: SOCA squad trash dodgy drivers car and video it

The cop squad accused of torturing suspects made a Life on Mars-style POP VIDEO of themselves smashing up a car with a man inside.

One officer filmed the action as Serious Organised Crime Agency colleagues bashed in the real-life victim's windows with baseball bats.

They then EDITED the shots, chose Tracy Chapman's single Fast Car as a SOUNDTRACK - and copied it on to a DVD as a SOUVENIR.

The unarmed driver was suspected of driving while disqualified and having stolen number plates. His car was trashed in the middle of the day on London's North Circular last November. The film footage - found during a search of Enfield Crime Squad's offices - was NOT used as court evidence.

A source said the thuggish tactics were like DCI Gene Hunt in scenes from the BBC retro-cops series Life on Mars, adding: "It was completely over the top."

The Met Police said: "We can't comment. It is a matter for the Independent Police Complaints Commission."

Six squad officers are waiting to hear if they will be charged over allegations they tortured suspects, falsified evidence and stole items during raids in 2008. One man claimed his head was held in a toilet while cops flushed it.

http://www.newsoftheworld.co.uk/news/430804/BRUTE-FARCE-SOCA-squad-trash-dodgy-drivers-car-and-video-it.html

It's not SOCA, News of The World, Sunday 9 August 2009

http://www.newsoftheworld.co.uk/news/444108/Its-not-SOCA-Officers-were-not-pa...

Q: You're not political?
A: I'm extremely political in a way that does no good to anybody.

Q: You don't participate?
A: I participate. I make demands, sign newspaper advertisements, vote, I make small campaign contributions to the candidate of my choice and turn my irony against the others. But I accomplish nothing. I march, it's ludicrous. In the last march there were eighty-seven thousand people marching, by the most conservative estimate, and yet being in the midst of them, marching with them ... I wanted to march with the Stationary Engineers, march under their banner, but two cops prevented me, they said I couldn't enter at that point, I had to go back to the beginning. So I went back to the beginning and marched with the Food Handlers for Peace and Freedom.

Q: What sort of people were they?
A: They looked just like everybody else. It's possible they weren't real food handlers. Maybe just the two holding the sign. I don't know. There were a lot of girls in black pajamas and peasant straw hats, very young girls, high-school girls, running, holding hands in a long chain, laughing....

Q: You've been pretty hard on our machines. You've withheld your enthusiasm, that's damaging...
A: I'm sorry.

Q: Do you think your irony could be helpful in changing the government?
A: I think the government is very often in an ironic relation to itself. And that's helpful. For example: we're spending a great deal of money for this army we have, a very large army, beautifully equipped. We're spending something on the order of twenty billions a year on it. Now, the whole point of an army is -- what's the word? -- deterrence. And the nut of deterrence is credibility. So what does the government do? It goes and sells off its surplus uniforms. And the kids start wearing them, uniforms or parts of uniforms, because they're cheap and have some sort of style. And immediately you get this vast clown army in the streets parodying the real army. And they mix periods, you know, you get parody British grenadiers and parody World War I types and parody Sierra Maestra types. So you have all these kids walking around wearing these filthy uniforms with wound stripes, hash marks, Silver Stars, but also ostrich feathers, Day-Glo vests, amulets containing powdered rhinoceros horn ... You have this splendid clown army in the streets standing over against the real one. And of course the clown army constitutes a very serious attack on all the ideas which support the real army including the basic notion of having an army at all. The government has opened itself to all this, this undermining of its own credibility, just because it wants to make a few dollars peddling old uniforms....

Q: How is my car?
Q: How is my nail?
Q: How is the taste of my potato?
Q: How is the cook of my potato?
Q: How is my garb?
Q: How is my button?
Q: How is the flower bath?
Q: How is the shame?
Q: How is the plan?
Q: How is the fire?
Q: How is the flue?
Q: How is my mad mother?
Q: How is the aphorism I left with you?

Q: You are an ironist?
A: It's useful.

- Extract from 'Kierkegaard Unfair to Schlegel', from the 'City Life'
collection by Donald Barthelme, published 1970.

They told each other the story of their lives, played cards a little, or, yawning and in pyjamas, lounged through the day in easy-chairs without saying a word. Suggestions of infinite repose, the gift of endless dreams.

Some, very few and seen there but seldom, led mysterious lives, had preserved an undefaced energy with the temper of buccaneers and the eyes of dreamers. They appeared to live in a crazy maze of plans, hopes, dangers, enterprises, ahead of civilisation, in the dark places; and their death was the only event of their fantastic existence that seemed to have a reasonable certitude of achievement.

They loved good deck-chairs, large native crews, and the distinction of being white. They shuddered at the thought of hard work, and led precariously easy lives, always on the verge of dismissal, always on the verge of engagement.

They talked everlastingly of turns of luck; and in all they said--in their actions, in their looks, in their persons--could be detected the soft spot, the place of decay, the determination to lounge safely through existence.

To Jim that gossiping crowd, seemed at first more unsubstantial than so many shadows. But at length he found a fascination in the sight of those men, in their appearance of doing so well on such a small allowance of danger and toil. In time, beside the original disdain there grew up slowly another sentiment; and suddenly, giving up the idea of going home...

- Conrad, obv.

"As a scholar and political activist living in and trying to make positive changes in the United States I was immediately struck by state-sponsored guidance telling me how to act. From day one of my involvement many years ago through to this day I have heard that if one desires to pursue social and/or political change in this country there are “correct” and “proper” methodologies in place to make these pursuits a reality. After all, this is a democracy, one that boasts itself as the freest land in all the world. If the people truly aim to change societal laws and norms, by God that is their right and there are proper channels to go through to ensure success. All social and political change in the United States has come about this way, I have been constantly told.

As a young activist I quickly learned what these rules were that were time tested and thus would ensure success. The rules of the game are as follows:

RULES FOR THE GAME OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1. You have the right to pursue social and political change as long as you follow the rules below.

2. All social and political change in the United States has come about ONLY through nonviolent methodologies and these are the ONLY methods which are permitted to be used.

3. With few exceptions, all activity must stay within the realm of behavior which is sanctioned or approved by the government. This directly relates to engaging in activities which are lawful and thus permitted by the government.

4. One rare exception to rule #3 has been the occasional use nonviolent civil disobedience when unjust laws were broken for the greater good of society. While it is doubtful any unjust laws exist within the United States in current times, if an individual did decide to commit an unlawful act of nonviolent civil disobedience, he or she must be prepared to submit to all penalties under the law resulting from this behaviour.

*Note to #4: On the extremely rare occasion when one may decide that a law is unjust and therefore should be broken, it is best to coordinate this activity with the local, state, or federal policing forces to ensure safety for the participants and the general public.

5. You have the right to pursue social and political change as long as you follow the rules above.

These rules, while ingenious in their mythological and utopian qualities, are completely fictitious."